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NO. 47 NOVEMBER 2018 Introduction 
Vostok-2018: Another Sign of 
Strengthening Russia-China Ties 
Not an Alliance, but Defense Cooperation Is Growing 
Brian G. Carlson 
Russia’s recent Vostok-2018 military exercises, in which China’s People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) participated for the first time, were another milestone in the increasingly 
close defense relationship between the two countries. Only a few years ago, Russia 
used these and other exercises to prepare its forces for the possibility of war with 
China. Now, at a time of strain in both countries’ relations with the West, China’s par-
ticipation is a sign of the value that both sides attach to their relationship. The two 
countries are not about to form a military alliance, but their growing defense coopera-
tion is likely to have a significant impact on global politics in the coming years. 
 
Russia held its quadrennial Vostok (East) 
military exercises September 11–17. The 
two most notable aspects of Vostok-2018 
were its projected size and China’s partici-
pation. Sergei Shoigu, the Russian defense 
minister, announced in August that the 
exercises would feature 300,000 military 
personnel, 36,000 tanks and armored 
vehicles, more than 1,000 aircraft, and 80 
ships, making these exercises the largest on 
Russian territory since the Soviet Union’s 
Zapad-81 exercises in 1981. The actual size 
of the exercises appears to have been con-
siderably smaller, as Shoigu’s figures for 
personnel reflected entire brigades and 
divisions rather than the particular battal-
ions and regiments that actually partici-
pated. 
The PLA sent 3,200 military personnel as 
well as 30 aircraft and 900 tanks and 
armored vehicles. China and Mongolia, 
which also participated, became the first 
countries outside of the former Soviet 
Union to join the Vostok exercises. Russia 
and China have been holding joint military 
exercises for more than a decade – includ-
ing joint drills under the auspices of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization since 
2005 and joint naval exercises since 2012 – 
but this was the first time that China had 
joined a domestic Russian military exercise. 
Although the PLA contingent was small, 
its presence signaled both China’s desire 
to learn from Russia’s recent military ex-
perience and the growing strength of the 
defense cooperation between the two 
countries. 
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Military Aspects 
In a change from previous practice in the 
Vostok series, the Russian military divided 
its forces into two groups, which simulated 
fighting each other rather than an imagi-
nary opponent. The blue “west state,” play-
ing the role of NATO, featured the Central 
Military District and the Northern Fleet. 
The red “east state” comprised the Eastern 
Military District and the Pacific Fleet. The 
red team repulsed the blue team’s incur-
sion, then counterattacked and pushed 
the opposing force deep into blue territory. 
In the naval component of the exercises, 
the Pacific Fleet defended itself against am-
phibious assaults by the Northern Fleet. In 
the exercises’ strategic nuclear component, 
Tu-95MS bombers flew into a US air defense 
identification zone near Alaska, prompting 
US F-22 fighters to scramble and escort 
them as they retreated. 
Meanwhile, Chinese forces joined their 
Russian counterparts for drilling in the Tsu-
gol combined arms training area, located 
near the border with Mongolia, where they 
practiced air-to-ground coordination, air-
borne assault, and coordinated air-artillery 
strikes. The Russian and Chinese forces 
conducted joint firing operations and tested 
their forces’ interoperability. 
The Russian military’s main purpose 
in these exercises was to improve its com-
mand-and-control capabilities. The exer-
cises posed formidable challenges in this 
area. For example, the military command 
had to oversee the movement of forces 
across long distances to the Eastern Military 
District as well as joint operations by multi-
ple services. Because the Vostok-2018 exer-
cises were held east of the Ural Mountains, 
the OSCE’s Vienna Document did not apply. 
This meant that Russia was under no obli-
gation to invite OSCE observers or to report 
to NATO on the content of the exercises. 
Despite being conducted in the Russian Far 
East, Vostok-2018’s scenario clearly simu-
lated military conflict with NATO. 
This represents a significant change. As 
recently as 2010, the Vostok exercises ap-
peared to simulate the defense of Russia’s 
eastern regions against a potential invasion 
by China. On the final day of that year’s 
exercises, Russian forces simulated a tacti-
cal nuclear strike against an invading force. 
In 2013, after the conclusion of Russia-
China joint naval exercises in the Sea of 
Japan, five Chinese warships left the exer-
cises and sailed into the Sea of Okhotsk. 
Russia responded by calling snap exercises 
in the Russian Far East. Although these 
exercises were not part of the Vostok series, 
they were the largest land and sea exercises 
in the region, up to that point, since the 
end of the Cold War. During 2014, as the 
West imposed sanctions on Russia follow-
ing the annexation of Crimea, Russia in-
tensified its diplomatic outreach to China. 
Nevertheless, the Vostok-2014 exercises 
held that summer were oriented toward the 
defense of the Russian Far East against an 
invasion by a state actor – a role that could 
only be played in the real world by China. 
The situation was strikingly different this 
year. Although the exercises may have 
served to remind China about Russia’s mili-
tary capabilities, Russia went out of its way 
to signal that this was not their purpose. 
Instead, Russia sought to reassure China. At 
a time of close diplomatic relations, invit-
ing China to participate in such large-scale 
exercises so close to its border seemed an 
appropriate courtesy. Russia thereby con-
veyed a clear message that it does not view 
China as a military threat to its eastern 
regions. Beyond reassurance, Russia also 
enlisted China’s participation in order to 
underscore the message that it was sending 
to the West by holding large-scale drills 
simulating conflict with NATO. 
China also sought to achieve several 
military objectives by participating in the 
exercises. Vostok-2018 was an opportunity 
for the PLA to participate in drills focusing 
heavily on the command and control over 
combined arms operations – a crucial com-
ponent of any potential military conflict 
with the United States and its allies in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The exercises were also 
an opportunity for the PLA, which has not 
fought an armed conflict since 1979, to 
study Russia’s military, particularly lessons 
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from its recent combat experience in Syria. 
Strategy and tactics that the Russian mili-
tary has employed in that conflict featured 
prominently in Vostok-2018. 
Political Implications 
Through the Vostok-2018 exercises, Russia 
and China sent a clear signal to the United 
States and its NATO partners. Their message 
was that, if the West continues to apply 
what they consider to be undue pressure, 
then they will increase their own level of 
bilateral cooperation – including defense 
coordination – in response. Although the 
two countries continue to stress that they 
have no intention to form a military 
alliance, some Russian analysts suggest 
that Vostok-2018 may have been partly an 
attempt to work out the technical details of 
an alliance in advance while leaving open 
the possibility of such an arrangement in 
the future. Even if it falls short of a formal 
military alliance, increased military co-
operation by Russia and China could have 
significant implications for global politics. 
Vostok-2018 is another in a series of 
milestones reflecting a strengthened Russia-
China relationship, especially since the 
onset of the Ukraine crisis. After this crisis 
erupted, Russia and China increased their 
diplomatic coordination on a range of issues, 
including North Korea and cyberspace, and 
struck important deals in the arms and 
energy spheres. The downturn in US-China 
relations since the beginning of Donald 
Trump’s presidency has given China addi-
tional reasons to strengthen its cooperation 
with Russia. 
The level of defense cooperation between 
Russia and China is rising steadily. In 2016, 
the two countries held joint naval exercises 
in the South China Sea just weeks after 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague ruled against China’s expansive 
claims in that contested body of water. The 
two countries have also held joint naval 
exercises in the Mediterranean (2015) and 
Baltic (2017) seas. In recent years, Russia 
for the first time agreed to sell its most ad-
vanced weapons systems to China, most 
notably the S-400 air defense system and 
Su-35 fighter jets. The United States recently 
imposed sanctions on a Chinese defense 
company for purchases of Russian weapons, 
adding to the growing tensions in both 
countries’ relations with the United States. 
Russia and China may have intended to 
use the Vostok-2018 exercises to influence 
the course of events on the Korean Pen-
insula. Although their interests on the 
peninsula are not identical – with China 
primarily focused on the maintenance of 
North Korea as a buffer, and Russia more 
interested in the strategic and economic 
benefits to be gained from reunification 
or closer integration between North and 
South – China and Russia have neverthe-
less closely coordinated their diplomacy on 
this issue in recent years. Both countries 
have sought to limit pressure on the North 
Korean regime and secure a reduced US 
military footprint in Northeast Asia in 
return for steps toward denuclearization 
by the regime in Pyongyang. 
Although no publicly available evidence 
suggests that the Russian and Chinese mili-
taries have developed joint operational 
plans, some analysts suggest that the 
Korean Peninsula and Central Asia are the 
two regions most likely to be included in 
any such plans. The Vostok-2018 exercises 
may have been intended as a display of 
Russian and Chinese military power in 
Northeast Asia in anticipation of the pos-
sible outbreak of armed conflict on the 
Korean Peninsula. In advance of an ex-
pected second meeting between Trump and 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Russia 
and China are continuing their close diplo-
matic coordination with North Korea. 
Growing Russia-China Ties and 
Implications for the West 
Russia and China are not about to construct 
a formal military alliance, which would 
entail a mutual security guarantee. Neither 
country wishes to be drawn into a military 
conflict with the United States over the 
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other country’s regional ambitions. China 
declined to support either Russia’s recog-
nition of two breakaway regions in Georgia 
following the war in 2008 or its annexation 
of Crimea in 2014. Likewise, despite offer-
ing some diplomatic support, Russia main-
tains official neutrality on China’s maritime 
disputes in the South and East China seas. 
Growing defense coordination between 
Russia and China could, nevertheless, have 
significant implications for NATO. Even in 
the absence of a formal alliance treaty, the 
relationship could offer the two countries 
some of the benefits of an alliance. Al-
though neither Russia nor China is likely 
to intervene directly in a military conflict 
involving the other’s regional disputes, 
the ongoing existence of tensions along 
both countries’ peripheries stretches US 
resources and strategic attention. This 
situation potentially gives both countries 
some additional room for maneuver. In 
a crisis, events in one region could offer 
opportunities for the other country to seize 
in its own neighborhood. In addition, Rus-
sian arms sales strengthen China’s military 
capabilities, forcing the United States to 
expend additional resources to maintain 
its military advantage in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
These developments will have important 
implications for European security. Most 
significantly, they are likely to exert addi-
tional pressure on Germany and other Euro-
pean NATO members to increase defense 
spending. The Trump administration has 
placed this issue front and center in trans-
atlantic relations, but calls for greater bur-
den-sharing by European allies are likely to 
come from across the US political spectrum 
as strategic competition with China inten-
sifies. As Western leaders debate security 
policies during the coming years, they will 
need to pay increasing attention not only 
to Russia and China separately, but to the 
effects of their increasingly strong bilateral 
relationship and defense cooperation. 
Brian G. Carlson, a Trans-Atlantic Post-Doctoral Fellow in International Relations and  
Security, is a Visiting Fellow in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division at SWP. 
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